remind的用法,remind的用法及词组句子成分
编者语：
对于非常规货币政策，各国对其作用褒贬不一。当通货紧缩的尾部风险可见，而非常规货币政策持续太久时，央行独立性是否足以维持价格稳定，大家也都有着不同的看法，作者认为中央银行独立性是缓解政治和商业周期的价格稳定的必要条件，央行货币政策独立性如何在非常规货币政策的时代迎接各项挑战，全身而退，是我们所要讨论的问题。敬请阅读。
对于非常规货币政策，各国对其作用褒贬不一。当通货紧缩的尾部风险可见，而非常规货币政策持续太久时，央行独立性是否足以维持价格稳定，大家也都有着不同的看法，作者认为中央银行独立性是缓解政治和商业周期的价格稳定的必要条件，央行货币政策独立性如何在非常规货币政策的时代迎接各项挑战，全身而退，是我们所要讨论的问题。敬请阅读。
我今天的演讲囊括了一个重要的问题：非常规货币政策的时代，央行货币政策独立性受到了怎样的破坏与挑战，而它又如何在这样一个时代全身而退。
回顾当前的经济发展，许多故事涌上心头。美国新任总统特朗普批评美联储主席耶伦采取低利率政策。特别是，美联储被指责对现任总统特朗普存在偏见。英国首相特里莎公开反对英国央行政策，认为低利率剥夺了储蓄者的利息收入。此外，德国的“五个聪明人”（经济专家委员会）和德国财政部长沃尔夫冈·舍布勒克也均批评了欧洲央行行长德拉吉的负利率政策。在这种背景下，问题显而易见：当通货紧缩的尾部风险可见，而非常规货币政策持续太久时，央行独立性是否足以维持价格稳定？对这个问题大家显然有着不同的看法，但在此之前，我要明晰我的观点，中央银行独立性是缓解政治和商业周期的价格稳定的必要条件，同时在减少固有的通货膨胀方面存在偏差。
央行独立性：理论
关于中央银行独立性的研究可以追溯到20世纪70年代芝加哥学派倡导的理性预期革命。理性期望在缓解20世纪70年代的滞胀现象方面发挥了至关重要的作用。为了解决通货膨胀偏差的问题，货币政策应该承诺在低水平的通货膨胀预期下进行，以使私人通货膨胀预期同样固定在低的水平。最初，这种承诺采取中间政策目标的形式，例如货币供应增长目标，在1980年代初由里根和撒切尔政府分别在美国和英国引入;以及欧洲国家在欧洲货币体系背景下实施的汇率目标。中期政策目标成功地降低了主要工业化经济体的通货膨胀率，从而引入了大稳健时代。然而，货币需求的不稳定性和货币供应目标的不透明性使得后者的实施在操作上变得困难（Mourmouras&Arghyrou，2000）。另一方面，汇率目标很少能经受时间的考验，因此存在了一些可靠性问题，正如货币危机相关文献所示（Obstfeld，1996）。CBI与通货膨胀目标的引入，在很大程度上是对中间目标缺陷的反应。具体来说，一个独立的中央银行实行货币政策，其任务就是实现价格稳定，并且酌情选择满足这一目标所必需的工具，减少了通货膨胀偏差。理论上，这种通货膨胀增长可能是以更高的产出波动为代价的（Rogoff，1995）。然而，经验表明（Alesina&Summers，1993），CBI是一顿免费的午餐，因为它带来明显的增益而不引起同样显著的损失。实证研究发现中央银行独立性与通货膨胀当期和滞后一期负相关，与产出变化没有什么相关性。此外，CBI可以确保可持续公共债务， Mourmouras&Su（1995）建立了一个动态模型发现。由于其理论和实践优势，CBI在主要工业化经济体及其外部区域得到广泛采用。然而，独立的形式在经济和政治之间却不尽相同（Fischer，1995）。在经济独立下，中央银行可以自由选择没有外部干预的手段以实现其既定目标：英格兰银行是这种独立形式的一个例子。在政治独立性方面，中央银行独立选择其政策的目标以及最适合实现其自选目标的工具：欧洲央行是这种独立性的一个例子。
将货币政策委托给一个独立的中央银行将引发民主制衡的问题。这至少涉及到两个维度。首先，中央银行独立性的类型：我们朝着独立目标迈的越近，对透明度和问责制的需求就越高。第二个维度是为独立中央银行设定的数量目标。问责制随着政策目标的数量而下降，如一套政策工具，增加目标数量导致目标之间的权衡。当中央银行侧重于一个政策目标时，问责制的范围增加。这种问责制加强，加上通货膨胀货币政策的理论和经验优势，导致大多数采用中央银行独立性的国家将价格稳定定义为货币政策的首要目标。
展开全文
危机后的货币政策
2008年全球金融危机和随之而来的欧洲主权债务危机彻底改变了独立中央银行的运作框架。这些变化涉及三个层次。第一，我们现在已经认识到金融危机所带来的潜在实际经济成本，这一点是我们以前所缺乏的。第二，中央银行被赋予了新的宏观审慎任务，例如欧洲央行自2014年以来对欧盟进行的系统性银行监管。第三，危机后时代的价格稳定是为了防止通货紧缩，而不是过度通胀。
让我们快速回顾一下欧洲央行在过去九年的货币政策立场，对大萧条以来最严重的金融危机的反应。
表1.欧洲央行非常规货币政策
年份
非常规货币政策
2008年10月—12月
欧洲央行将基准利率从4.25％降至2.50％，通过外汇掉期提供美元流动性，扩展在欧元系统融资业务中作为抵押品的资产列表，引入6个月长期再融资操作（LTRO），并决定主要再融资操作将通过固定利率的招标程序进行，全额分配。
2009年
欧洲央行将基准利率从2.50％降至1.00％，并引入CBPP1
2010年
欧洲央行激活证券市场计划
2011年
欧洲央行引入CBPP2，并引入了3年期的LTRO
2012年
欧洲央行宣布直接货币交易计划
2013年
欧洲央行将基准利率降至0.25％，并引入前瞻性指引
2014年
欧洲央行将基准利率下调至0.05％，存款利率下调至-0.20％，这是首次实行负利率，并推出目标长期再融资操作（TLTRO），期限为4年
2015年
欧洲央行推出扩展的资产购买计划（APP），并将存款利率降至-0.30％
2016年
欧洲央行加速扩张资产购买计划（APP），并将主要再融资操作（MRO）利率降至0.00％，存款利率降至-0.40％。
事实上，10个最大的中央银行现在拥有总额21.4万亿美元的资产，占世界经济的29％，比2015年底增长10％，是2008年9月中旬的两倍，几乎是所有债务的一半。（如图1所示）
Chart 1. The combined assets of the 10 largest central banks
最后，世界上约75％的中央银行资产由四个地区的政策制定者控制：中国，美国，日本和欧元区。英格兰，巴西，瑞士，沙特阿拉伯，印度和俄罗斯的中央银行，平均占有2.5％。（见图2）。
Chart 2. Central banks’ combined assets
低通胀时期中央银行独立性的挑战
2008年金融危机所带来的低通胀环境，为央行独立性带来了新的挑战。这些挑战分为两类，首先，中央银行的工具独立性受到外部各方的质疑。第二，即使工具的独立性没有受到挑战，它也可能因为条件变化而受到牵连。这两种挑战显然是相互关联的。一个是独立的央行面临着有效的限制，在其政策的执行过程中发现很难履行其任务。另一方面，一个央行的独立性受到威胁可能会限制其政策（工具）的选择。总之，当前的形势对近年来建立的货币支配范式提出了挑战。
工具独立性的外部挑战主要源于政治压力。以美国为例，提议被提交到联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）后；要采取具体的方程来制定货币政策，需要联邦公开市场委员会的证明，经过国会的听证和调查，以决定最终的货币政策。另一方面，在欧元区，量化宽松由于扩张过快、限制过多而受到挑战。英国货币政策也受到了类似的批评。
我自己的判断是，挑战不应该在独立的概念，而是在当前的经济政策组合：宽松的货币政策加上紧缩的财政政策。通过保持长期负利率，货币政策的再分配效应将变得更加明显。
中央银行的独立性之所以会受到担心，是因为中央银行在实行一个扩展任务目标时，是否可以在一个民主的政治和经济制度下保持适当程度的透明操作。
总的来说，一个独立的中央银行，需要民主问责制，需要公众的广泛支持.。显然，随着持续的负利率，你迟早会失去广大选民的支持。
结论
最后，可以得到广泛认同的是，在大稳健时期，中央银行独立性主要负责保证高价值的公共物品的价格稳定，这被证明是一个非常成功的制度创新。这一政策目标和中央银行独立性的追求，应该在当前的低通胀时期持续保持，并且对央行独立性也提出多重挑战。
金融危机告诉我们保持金融稳定尤其重要。毫无疑问，中央银行运作需要考虑金融稳定风险.。然而，央行是否应该对金融稳定负主要责任还不得而知。我认为，一个独立的中央银行，应专注于价格稳定，随着结构调整，适当的采取可持续的财政政策，增强技术以确保宏观审慎稳定，为恢复正常生产条件和就业提供了最广阔的道路，这也是最终的目的。独立的中央银行能很好地协调与各项政策的关系，以行使最佳的经济政策。
附英文原文：
“Central Bank Independence Revisited in the Era of Unconventional Monetary Policy”
My speech today revolves one single important question: if and how the concept of an independent central bank has been challenged, or perhaps even undermined, in an era of unconventional monetary policies, including their own exit strategies.
Quite a few examples come to mind, especially looking at the latest developments. US President-elect Donald Trump criticised Fed Chair Janet Yellen for the Fed’s policy of low interest rates. In particular, the Fed has been accused of bias by President-elect Trump. British Prime Minister Theresa May came openly against the Bank of England’s policy under Governor Mark Carney saying that low interest rates deprive savers of interest income. Also, Germany’s “five wise men” (Council of Economic Experts) and German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble criticised ECB President Mario Draghi for his negative interest rate policy. Against this background, the ultimate question is quite straightforward: is central bank independence sufficient for price stability when the tail risk of deflation is visible and unconventional monetary policies last too long? Opinions differ on this and I will give you my own view on this question in a minute, but before that let me make my view clear thatcentral bank independence is a necessary condition for price stability both in terms of mitigating a political business cycle, but also in terms of reducing the inflationary bias inherent in monetary policy.
Central bank independence: theory
The intellectual roots of central bank independence (or CBI) can be traced back to the rational expectations revolution, pioneered by the Chicago School in the 1970s. Rational expectations played a vital role in breaking the intellectual deadlock in the effort to address the stagflation phenomenon of the 1970s. To address the problem of inflation bias, monetary policy should be conducted under a technology of credible commitment to low future inflation rates so that private inflation expectations are anchored to equally low levels. Initially, this commitment took the form of intermediate policy targets, such as targets for money supply growth, introduced in the early 1980s by the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the US and the UK respectively; or exchange rate targets implemented, among others, by European countries in the context of the European Monetary System. Intermediate targets were successful in lowering inflation in major industrialised economies, thus introducing the Great Moderation era. However, the instability of money demand and the opaqueness of money supply targets rendered the latter’s implementation operationally difficult (see Mourmouras and Arghyrou, 2000). On the other hand, exchange rate targets rarely stood the test of time, thus preserving questions of credibility, as demonstrated by the literature on currency crises (see Obstfeld, 1996).
CBI, along with the introduction of inflation targeting, was largely the profession’s response to the shortcomings of intermediate targets. Specifically, delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank, with a formal mandate to achieve price stability and granting discretion in the choice of instruments necessary to meet this objective, reduces the inflation- bias problem as a result of the central banker’s objective function including an inflation- aversion parameter higher than the government’s. Theoretically, this inflation gain may come at the cost of higher output volatility (see Rogoff, 1995). Empirical evidence, however, (see e.g. Alesina and Summers, 1993 and Cuckierman, 2008) suggests that CBI may operate as free-lunch, in the sense that it involves an obvious gain without causing an equally obvious loss. Empirical measures of central bank independence are found to be negatively correlated with the first and second moment of inflation, showing little, if any, correlation with output variability. Furthermore, CBI can be beneficial in ensuring sustainable public debt dynamics, as theoretically shown by Mourmouras and Su (1995) in a dynamic game set-up. As a result of its theoretical and empirical advantages, CBI was widely adopted (particularly in the 1990s) in major industrialised economies and beyond. The form of independence, however, varies between instrument (economic) and goal (political) independence (see Fischer, 1995). Under the former, the operational goals of the central bank are exogenously determined, either by legislation or by another official body such as the finance ministry. Under instrument independence, the central bank is free to choose without external interference the means (the policy instruments) best suited to meet its given goals: the Bank of England is an example of this form of independence. Under goal independence, the central bank chooses independently both the goals of its policy, as well as the instruments best suited to meet its self-selected goal: the ECB is an example of this type of independence.
Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank raises important questions of democratic checks and balances, i.e. questions of transparency and accountability. Accountability, in turn, is related to at least two dimensions. First, the type of central bank independence: the closer we move towards the independence goal, the higher the need for transparency and accountability. The second dimension is the number of goals set for the independent central bank. Perhaps non-intuitively, accountability declines with the number of policy goals, as given a set of policy instruments, increasing the number of goals results in trade-offs between goals. As the welfare ordering of policy outcomes under trade-offs is intrinsically more difficult than performance-ordering under a single policy objective, the scope for accountability increases when the central bank focuses on one policy objective. This accountability enhancement, combined with the theoretical and empirical advantages of inflation-averse monetary policy, resulted in the majority of the countries adopting central bank independence to define price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy. The ECB is a characteristic example of this trend. On the other hand, the Fed, whose dual mandate includes price stability and maximum employment (plus moderate long-term interest rates), is a notable exception.
Monetary policy in the post-crisis period
The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the ensuing European sovereign debt crisis have fundamentally changed the operational framework of independent central banks. These changes relate to three levels. The first is methodological: We now have an appreciation of the potential real economic costs of financial crises that we previously lacked. The second change is that central banks have been given new macro-prudential tasks, such as the supervision of systemic banks in the EMU, conducted by the ECB since 2014. The third change is the situation on the ground: Rather than preventing excessive inflation, price stability in the post-crisis era is about preventing deflation.
Let me quickly remind you of the ECB’s monetary policy stance over the last nine years as a response to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, leading to negative interest rates and entering practically unchartered territory.
Table 1. ECB’s non-standard measures
Year
Non-standard measures
Oct-Dec 2008
ECB cuts the base interest rate from 4.25% to 2.50%, provides US dollar liquidity through foreign exchange swaps, expands the list of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem funding operations, introduces the 6-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and decides the main refinancing operations to be carried out through a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment.
2009
ECB cuts the base interest rate from 2.50% to 1.00%, and introduces the first Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1).
2010
ECB activates the Securities Markets Programme (SMP).
2011
The ECB launches the second Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2) and introduces the 3-year LTROs.
2012
The ECB announces the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs).
2013
The ECB cuts the base interest rate to 0.25% and introduces forward guidance.
2014
The ECB cuts the base interest rate to 0.05% and the deposit facility rate to -0.20%, bringing it for the first time in negative territory and introduces the Targeted Longer- Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) with a 4-year maturity.
2015
ECB introduces the expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and cuts the deposit facility rate to -0.30%.
2016
ECB accelerates the expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and cuts the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate to 0.00% and the deposit facility rate to -0.40%.
Indeed, the 10 largest central banks now own assets totaling $21.4 trillion, accounting for 29% of the world economy, up by 10% from end-2015, double what it was in mid- September 2008 and almost half the value of all debt in Bloomberg’s global bond index (as shown in Chart 1)!
Chart 1. The combined assets of the 10 largest central banks
Finally, almost 75% of the world’s central bank assets are controlled by policy-makers in four regions: China, the US, Japan and the eurozone. The following six – that is, the central banks of England, Brazil, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, India and Russia – each account for an average of 2.5%. The remaining 107 central banks tracked by Bloomberg, mostly with IMF data, hold less than 13% (see Chart 2).
Chart 2. Central banks’ combined assets
Challenges for central bank independence in the low-inflation period
The legacy of the great financial crisis of 2008 and the low inflation conditions that have since been observed bring new challenges for central bank independence. These challenges fall into two categories. First, the instruments’ independence of central banks has been put into question by external parties. Second, even if the instruments’ independence is not formally challenged, it may be effectively compromised as a result of the changed conditions. The two kinds of challenges are obviously interconnected. A formally independent central bank facing effective constraints in the conduct of its policy may find it harder to deliver on its mandate and may subsequently face calls for restricted independence. On the other hand, a central bank whose independence is under threat may be constrained in its policy (instruments) choices. All in all, current circumstances pose challenges for the successful regime of monetary dominance paradigm established in recent years.
External challenges to the instrument’s independence mainly stem from political pressure. In the US, for example, proposals have been tabled to subject the monetary policy of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to unlimited congressional policy audits; adopt a specific equation in setting monetary policy and require from the FOMC to justify, through congressional hearings and investigations, deviations from the policy dictated by that equation; and use the Fed as a source of finance to monetize specific government initiatives (see Fischer, 2015). In the euro-area, on the other hand, the QE programme has been challenged both for being too expansive, as well as for being too limited. Similar criticism has been voiced regarding the effects of monetary policy in the UK.
My own verdict is that the challenge should not be in the very concept of independence, but rather in the current economic policy mix: loose monetary policy plus tight fiscal policy. By keeping interest rates in negative territory for too long, the redistribution effects of monetary policy and the perceived degree of success of meeting the mandated objectives become more pronounced.
The independence of central banks may be scrutinised due to concerns as to whether a central bank with an extended mandate of objectives can operate transparently and with an appropriate degree of accountability in the context of a democratic political and economic system.
All in all, an independent central bank that is subject to democratic accountability needs broader support from the public. Clearly, with persistent negative rates you are bound sooner or later to lose major parts of the broad constituency that you need as an independent central banker.
Concluding remarks
In closing, it is true that during the Great Moderation period, central bank independence proved a highly-successful institutional innovation, primarily responsible for delivering the highly-valued public good of price stability. This policy objective, and the independence of central bank in its pursuit, should be maintained in the current period of low inflation, posing multiple challenges for central bank independence.
Having said that, the lessons from the destabilising effect of financial crises cannot be ignored. Without any doubt, the information set under which central banks operate should be enhanced to consider risks to financial stability. Whether, however, central banks should be primarily responsible for ensuring financial stability is less clear - the jury on this question is still out. However, on the balance of existing theory and empirical evidence, I maintain that an independent central bank focused on price stability, along with structural adjustments, appropriate and sustainable fiscal policies and an enhanced technology ensuring macro-prudential stability offer the most promising path for restoring normal growth conditions and the creation of jobs, which is the ultimate objective. Independent central banks can exercise optimal policies towards delivering their mandated objectives only when they are well-coordinated with other policies, including fiscal and structural ones.（完）
文章来源：国际清算银行 2016年12月23日（本文仅代表作者观点）
本篇编辑：王昌耀
【纽伦港新动态】专栏往期回顾：
第356期：未来银行业思考——欧洲系列之营业网点篇
第357期：分布式账本技术对欧洲中央银行的意义
第358期：杜德利：美国金融监管体系的重要进展和变化
第359期：美国政府债台高筑给世界带来什么
第360期：金融科技的机遇与挑战
第361期：李小加：常怀希望与梦想
第362期：欧洲的生产力挑战
第363期：美国政策组合的变化：全球收益与风险
第364期：包凡：资本市场中的金融科技
第365期：2017香港人民币业务展望——守得云开见月明
第366期：香港地区融资融券业务风险管理经验借鉴及启示
第367期：香港外汇及衍生工具市场
第368期：欧洲央行：2017是创新零售支付服务的决定性一年
第369期：美国维持长期低利率的原因
第370期：“一带一路”贸易与香港转口港功能
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【纽伦港新动态】专栏往期回顾：
第356期：未来银行业思考——欧洲系列之营业网点篇
第357期：分布式账本技术对欧洲中央银行的意义
第358期：杜德利：美国金融监管体系的重要进展和变化
第359期：美国政府债台高筑给世界带来什么
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温馨提示：现微信最新版本“订阅号”已实现公众号置顶功能，广大读者可点开“金融读书会”公众号，点“置顶公众号”键，即可将“金融读书会”置顶，方便查阅。
温馨提示：现微信最新版本“订阅号”已实现公众号置顶功能，广大读者可点开“金融读书会”公众号，点“置顶公众号”键，即可将“金融读书会”置顶，方便查阅。